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‘LOVING TOO MUCH’: THE TEXT OF PLUTARCH, THEMISTOKLES 2. 3*   
Ziegler’s Teubner text of Themistokles 2. 3 reads:   
e ¬peì κaì tøn paideúsewn tàv mèn h¬qopoioùv h£ pròv h™donän tina κaì cárin
e ¬leuqérion spoudazoménav o¬κnhrøv κaì a¬proqúmwv e ¬xemánqane, tøn d’ ei ¬v 
súnesin h£ prâxin † legoménwn dñlov h®n u™pererøn par’ h™liκían w™v tñı fúsei 
pisteúwn.
tina om. U | legoménhn S meletwménwn Holzapfel | u™pererøn Madvig: u™perorøn SU
For even when it came to his studies he used to learn reluctantly and unenthusiastically those which form
character or are pursued with a view to any pleasant or liberal accomplishment, but he clearly had an ex-
cessive love beyond his years for what was said † with a view to intelligence and action, because he trusted
his nature.
Ziegler followed Madvig and Hercher in emending u™perorøn (‘disdaining’, ‘being
indifferent to’), the reading of all good mss., to u™pererøn (‘loving too much’)1. This
emendation was accepted by Flacelière and Juneaux in their Budé edition (1961), and
more recently by Marr (1998). It was rejected, however, by Holden in his commen-
tary (1892), Perrin in her Loeb edition (1914), Frost in his commentary (1980) and
Manfredini and Piccirilli in the Fondazione Lorenzo Valla edition (1983), all of whom
print u™perorøn. Furthermore Martin, in a short article of 1964, cited with approval
by Piccirilli and Frost, attacked the emendation as unnecessary and giving poor
sense2. The purpose of this paper is to readdress the textual problems of the passage,
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* This paper was written at the Freie Universität Berlin while I was a fellow of the Alexander von Hum-
boldt Foundation. I am indebted to Christopher Pelling for this comments.
1 Madvig (1871) 88; Hercher (1878). Neither explained the reasons for their emendation. In fact, Madvig
and Hercher were more concerned to argue, on the grounds of sense, against ou¬c u™perorøn, the reading of 
Parisinus 1675 (E), which was printed by Sintenis (see below, p. 153). All subsequent editions justifiably reject
the ou¬c, which is not found in the best mss.
2 Martin (1964) 192–4; Frost (1980) and Piccirilli (1983) ad loc. Cf. Piccirilli (1982b) 212, approving 
Frost’s rejection of the emendation; Moles (1985) 260, approving Manfredini’s rejection of the emendation 
because of ‘the simple fact that u™perorøn makes sense and u™pererøn does not’.
and show that, while u™perorøn cannot be rejected on linguistic grounds, u™pererøn
makes more sense, and suits the context better3. 
Let us begin with the object of Themistokles’ disdain (u™perorøn) or love (u™per-
erøn), namely tøn d’ ei ¬v súnesin h£ prâxin † legoménwn. Ziegler marks this as 
unsatisfactory. There is no difficulty with ei ¬v súnesin h£ prâxin (‘with a view to intelli-
gence or action’)4, but the phrase as a whole is in context rather difficult. Some 
scholars have taken tøn … legoménwn as neuter plural and the meaning as ‘what was
said with a view to intelligence and action’5. But after tøn paideúsewn tàv mén, one
would most naturally take tøn d’ as feminine plural, sc. paideúsewn. Martin takes it
in this way, and also takes ei ¬v súnesin h£ prâxin legoménwn as parallel to e ¬leuqeríoiv
κaì a¬steíaiv legoménaiv in the next sentence (activities ‘said to be liberal and culti-
vated’), and translates ‘those studies that were reputed to develop practical intel-
ligence or to prepare one for worldly affairs’ [my letter spacing]6. But the two phrases
are not really parallel as they stand: legoménaiv [ei ®nai] is not parallel to legoménwn ei ¬v
and the latter cannot mean ‘reputed to develop’. Marr attempts to make some sense of
legoménwn and translates, ‘those subjects which are taught with a view to …’. But
légw paideúseiv or similar in the sense of ‘teach lessons’ is unparalleled. The text
must, then, as Ziegler suspected, be corrupt. Holzapfel’s emendation of legoménwn
to meletwménwn is a possibility (‘lessons studied with a view to’) (Holzapfel)7. 
A simpler solution might be simply to delete legoménwn entirely and take tøn with
paideúsewn and sc. spoudazoménwn from the earlier part of the sentence (‘studies
pursued with a view to …’); the occurrence of legoménaiv in the next sentence might
help to explain the corruption. Alternatively one might insert an infinitive dependent
on legoménwn, such as sunteínein (‘said to conduce to’) or sumbállesqai (said to
contribute to)8.
Whichever solution we choose, it seems clear that this part of the sentence refers to
activities or studies which promoted ‘intelligence or action’ (súnesin h£ prâxin) 9. But
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3 Further discussion of Them. 2 can be found in Duff (2008a), 3–11; cf. also idem (2008b) on Them. 1. On
the Themistokles – Camillus pair as a whole, see Stadter (1983–4); Larmour (1992); Duff (forthcoming).
4 For ei ¬v in this sense, cf. e.g. Plato, Gorg. 519e: paideúein a¬nqråpouv ei ¬v a¬retän.
5 E.g. Perrin: ‘to all that was said for the cultivation of sagacity or practical efficiency’. Holden: ‘anything
that was said referring to (the improvement of) the understanding or practical life’.
6 Cf. Carena’s ‘per quelli [insegnamenti] r i tenuti  ut i l i  (‘considered useful’) all’intelligenza e all’azione’
[my italics]. Chambry in the Budé edition paraphrases as ‘celles [les études] qui se rapportent, comme on dit, à
l’intelligence et à l’action’, thus avoiding spelling out the relationship between legoménwn and ei ¬v.
7 Cf. the suggestions of Reiske (1774–1782), i. 835: ginoménwn (‘happening’), tetagménwn (‘prescribed’) or
sumballoménwn (‘contributing’).
8 E. g. ps.-Plut. De mus. 1144c: tñv … suggumnasíav (légw dè tñv sunteinoúshv ei ¬v tæn toû h™rmosménou
xúnesin …); Plato, Symp. 184e, ei ¬v frónhsin κaì tæn a¢llhn a¬retæn sumbállesqai; Arist. Eud. Eth. 1234a.
9 Perhaps to be taken together as ‘practical intelligence’ or ‘intelligence leading to practice’ (a kind of 
hendiadys): cf. drastärion súnesin in 2. 6. Cf. also Diod. 33. 7. 7 (praκtiκæ súnesiv); Polyb. 2. 47. 5 (κata-
noøn dè tòn ’Antígonon κaì prâxin κaì súnesin e ¢conta). Martin (1961) and (1964) 193 (quoted above), trans-
lates súnesiv itself as ‘practical intelligence’.
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is Themistokles said to be ‘despising’ (u™perorøn) or ‘loving too much’ (u™pererøn)
such things? Martin argued against u™pererøn both on linguistic grounds and on 
grounds of sense. First, he claimed that active forms of the verb u™pererân were un-
attested. He was aware of u™perhrásqh in Aelian, VH 12. 1, 120. 13 Hercher (= 127. 14
Dilts): crónwı dè uçsteron u™perhrásqh mèn taúthv o™ Kûrov, a¬nthrâto dè κaì u™pò
e ¬κeínhv. He took it, however, with LSJ, as the aorist of the deponent u™peréramai not
of u™pereráw. But h¬rásqhn is the usual aorist of e ¬ráw, so u™perhrásqh here could
equally be regarded as a form of u™pereráw. But there are also a few examples of 
unambiguously active forms of u™pererân. Most relevant here is Proklos, Commen-
tary on Plato’s Republic I 171. 11 Kroll, where Plato is described as tñv ¿Omhriκñv
poiäsewv u™pererønta. So u™pererøn is not inadmissible as a form10. Furthermore, a
parallel for u™pererân in the sense of excessive commitment is provided by u™pera-
gapân, which is well attested in Plutarch: e.g. Cato Min. 4. 2, where it is used of Cato
the Younger’s excessive and damaging attachment to his principles11. 
Martin also claimed that ‘the overall sense of chapter two’ was against u™pererøn.
He argued that, ‘one of the key points of chapter two is that Themistocles relied
exclusively on his untutored, native synesis throughout his boyhood and even into his
youth and that only later did he resort to paideia. To introduce a conjecture that 
makes Plutarch say that as a boy Themistocles exhibited his confidence in his physis
by his devotion to that aspect of his paideia which dealt with synesis is to introduce an
at least apparent inconsistency that demands explanation’12. Piccirilli, in his commen-
tary, repeated Martin’s objections: having Themistokles specially interested in his 
studies would, he claimed, contradict the way he is otherwise characterised, which has
him despising paideia and trusting only in his natural endowments.
This objection, I hope to show, is faulty on two counts. First, it elides the difference
implied between what are presented as two distinct types of studies, and the results
they produce. On the one hand, there are ‘those studies which form character 
(h¬qopoioúv) 13 or are pursued with a view to any pleasant or liberal accomplishment’.
On the other hand, there is the more practical kind of study, which aims not at 
the improvement of character, but at the acquisition of practical skill or cleverness.
Martin’s objection also misunderstands the logic of the chapter, which sets up a 
contrast between good e¯thos and the education which might produce it, and physis,
and the practical skills with which Themistokles was born. The passage has Themi-
stokles neglecting real education but concentrating on improving these latter skills
and abilities. In the rest of this paper, I hope to demonstrate why a contrast between
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10 Other examples are admittedly late and few: Theodoros Hexapterygos Rhet., Progymnasmata 1. 30 
(tñv κórhv u™pererâı); Photios, Fragmenta in epistulam ad Romanos 493 (u™pererân au¬toû).
11 See Duff (1999) 157.
12 Martin (1964) 193 and 194.
13 For h¬qopoióv in this sense, see Duff (1999) 37 and the passages cited there. Elsewhere in Plutarch’s
works, the mark of real education is that it moulds and forms character (h®qov). This is laid out most explicitly
in the On moral virtue (Perì h¬qiκñv a¬retñv), e.g. 44 c–d.
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Themistokles’ attitude to these two types of education is essential to the logic of the
passage. I also hope to demonstrate that the use of an erotic metaphor to describe
Themistokles’ enthusiasm for the practical is consistent both with the wider Themi-
stokles-tradition and with the imagery used of him elsewhere in Plutarch’s Life.
Practical training and true education
Them. 2 is a discussion of Themistokles’ character, as revealed in his childhood and
in his attitude to education14. It begins with the claim that Themistokles was ‘by 
nature intelligent (sunetóv)’, but ‘by choice fond of great action and politics’ (mega-
loprágmwn κaì politiκóv) (2. 1)15. The mén and the dé mark a contrast between physis
(‘nature’) and proairesis, or character, which will continue throughout the passage16.
Themistokles’ intelligence and interest in practical action are confirmed and illustrated
in the next sentence, where Plutarch remarks on his tendency not to play with the
other children but instead to spend his free time composing speeches of prosecution
or defence: he has an eye to the practical from the beginning. Note that the point here
is not just that Themistokles was shrewd or intelligent by nature; he also acted on it.
In fact, the literal meaning of the word proairesis (‘choice’) is probably important
here: Themistokles’ interest in the practical is deliberate. And it is because of this 
precocious, deliberate concentration on practical skills (‘hence’, oçqen), that Themi-
stokles’ teacher tells him, ‘You will not be anything small, my child, but great, for
sure, either good or bad’ (2. 2)17.
The mention of the teacher provides a smooth transition to discussion of his educa-
tion (2. 3), and the point here should be pushing the same way. This is what is implied
by the κaí in κaì tøn paideúsewn: ‘even in his studies’18. We are thus expecting to
have mention made of his concentration on practical action. The manuscript reading
u™perorøn would deny, however, any such concentration. It would also destroy the
contrast implied between them by the mén … dé structure, and would have both parts
of the sentence meaning much the same, i.e. that Themistokles rejected all studies.
While this might be possible grammatically, it would go against the logic of the 
passage to this point, and disrupt the smooth continuation of the contrast begun in 
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14 See Duff (2008a) 3–11.
15 tñı mèn fúsei sunetóv, tñı dè proairései megaloprágmwn κaì politiκóv. A reworking of Thuc. 1. 138. 3:
see Martin (1961) 327–31.
16 On proairesis see Gill (1983) 479–80; (1996) 71–2, 249–50. On proairesis in Plutarch, see Duff (1999) 39,
with further bibliography; (2008a) 4.
17 ou¬dèn e ¢sei, paî, sù miκrón, a¬llà méga pántwv a¬gaqòn h£ κaκón (Ziegler’s text). The Attic form e ¢sei is
Fuhr’s emendation for e ¢shı, the reading of the mss. of the tripartite recension (U), presumably on the basis that
this better explains the reading of the Seitenstettensis manuscript (S), e ¬v a¬eí. It is accepted by all subsequent
editors. But elsewhere Ziegler prints only the koine form e ¢shı, which should be accepted here.
18 Cf. Fuhr (1880) ad loc.: ‘e ¬peì κaì bestätigt das ausgesprochene Urtheil’.
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2. 119. There mén … dé marked a contrast between nature and character. Here, if we
read u™perorøn, the mén and dé would merely mark coordination (‘both … and’), and
the second half of the contrast would be unmarked (‘he rejected all education, since he
put his trust in nature’). But in fact the mén clause concerns those studies which might
have improved Themistokles’ character (‘character-forming’ studies), whereas the dé
clause concerns the very qualities of which Themistokles’ nature was said in 2. 1 to
consist. It would make much more sense to say that, even in his studies, he continued
to show the same bias towards those activities in which he naturally excelled (‘because
he trusted his nature’), but rejected the kind of real education that would have 
moulded his character20. 
Furthermore, if we accept the manuscript reading it is hard to see how the phrase
par’ h™liκían could be interpreted. Themistokles would then be said to despise or 
be indifferent to practical studies ‘beyond his years’ – as though such disdain were 
a feature normally gained with age21. This might explain why the copyist of the 
14th-century ms. Parisinus 1675 (E), or of an earlier ancestor, has inserted ou¬c before
u™perorøn (‘not looking down on, contrary to [what one would expect of someone
of his] age’), presumably in an attempt to get some sense out of the sentence as it stood
– though this would render the next phrase (‘since he trusted in his nature’) very diffi-
cult22. If we accept the emendation to u™pererøn (‘loving too much’) on the other
hand, par’ h™liκían now makes perfect sense. A passionate attention to practical 
studies at an early age could well be described as unusual in a youngster23. 
The rest of the passage continues the notion of Themistokles’ lack of real education
and concentration on practical training. The next sentence (2. 4) has Themistokles
claiming that, although he did not know music, he knew how to make a small city
great: that, in other words, although he did not have a liberal education he had learnt
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19 So Marr (1998) ad loc.: ‘The sense is that Themistocles, who was reluctant to learn the character-forming
elements of education, had by contrast  a great passion (“far beyond his years”) for those elements which 
develop intelligence (súnesiv) and practical efficiency (prâxiv). Compare 2. 1, “by nature intelligent”, “life of
action and politics”.’
20 Cf. Fuhr (1880) ad loc.: ‘das auf allgemeine Bildung und Erheiterung Abzweckende erlernte er träge 
widerwillig, schenkte dagegen den Lehren der praktischen Staatsklugheit eine über sein Alter hinausgehende
Beachtung, im Vertrauen auf seine Anlagen’.
21 Perrin translates, ‘he clearly showed an indifference beyond his years’ and Carena, ‘dimostrava una
grande noncuranza, in contrasto con l’età sua’. Waterfield translates ‘he showed an unchildlike contempt† for
a merely theoretical approach to intelligence and practical action’, but rightly marks the text as corrupt.
22 Reiske (1774–1782) i. 835, suggested emending w™v to pwv and punctuating, u™perorøn, par’ h™liκían
pwv tñı fúsei pisteúwn (‘trusting in his nature to an extent somewhat beyond his years’), but ‘trusting one’s
nature’ is no more a feature normally gained with age than is ‘looking down on studies that form character’.
23 par’ h™liκían when used of the young always implies precociousness: doing something at a younger age
than is normally expected. The implications can be positive (e.g. Alex. 4. 8: Alexander’s spirit is ‘serious and
lofty beyond his years’), negative (e.g. Ant. 2. 5: the young Antony amassed debts ‘beyond his years’) or 
ambiguous (e.g. Cato Min. 1. 2: the young Cato’s impulses had an ‘effective strength beyond his years’). Some
more examples are given by Holden ad loc. and Frazier (1996) 75.
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practical political skills very well24. The story is introduced by another oçqen (‘hence’)
and so is meant to confirm the statements of the previous sentence, and this works
best if the previous sentence also had him neglecting liberal education and concen-
trating on the practical25. Plutarch then goes on to discuss Themistokles’ teachers 
(2. 5). Themistokles cannot, Plutarch claims, on chronological grounds have studied
under Anaxagoras and Melissos. Rather he studied under Mnesiphilos, who, Plutarch
reports (2. 6), taught ‘what was then called wisdom’ (tæn tóte κalouménhn sofían),
but was in reality ‘political cleverness (deinóthta politiκän) and active intelligence
(drastärion súnesin)’ – that is, those very features on which he concentrated in his
lessons (cf. súnesin h£ prâxin) 26. The contrast here, then, between intelligence (synesis,
deinotes) and wisdom (sophia) is aligned with the contrast, central to this passage, be-
tween practical training and true education, and between nature and character. His 
studying under Mnesiphilos is an example of his devotion to such practical training27. 
In fact, this pattern in which a gifted individual pays great attention to practical
training, often military or rhetorical, and rejects or is uninterested in true character-
forming studies, often conceived of in terms of literature or music, can be paralleled
elsewhere in Plutarch’s Lives. The clearest example, perhaps, is the young Philo-
poimen. Despite benefiting from tuition by two Platonic philosophers (1. 2–5), Philo-
poimen’s character was flawed (ch. 2). ‘For’ Plutarch tell us, ‘from his childhood he
loved soldiering and devoted himself to lessons useful to soldiering’ (3. 2). Later in
life, Plutarch goes on, ‘when he had freed himself from teachers and tutors’ (4. 1), he
spent his time only in soldiering and outdoor work, and rejected all forms of literature
which did not have a practical application (4. 8). ‘This man’, Plutarch concludes,
‘seems to have pursued military matters more than was necessary’ and looked down
on other men as inactive (or ‘impractical’, a¬práκtwn)’ (4. 10). Plutarch makes similar
points about the unbalanced education and flawed characters of Pyrrhos and Marius
(Pyrrh. 8. 3–7, Mar. 2. 1–2). In the former case, Pyrrhos is said to be ‘continually 
studying and philosophising’ on warfare and leadership, as though it were ‘the most
royal of lessons’, but counted other studies ‘to be of no value’ (Pyrrh. 8. 6). An anec-
dote follows, similar in tone and purpose to one about Themistokles: when Pyrrhos
was asked at a symposium to judge the merits of two musicians, he dismissed the 
question and made a reply about generalship (8. 7)28. But perhaps the most striking
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24 The anecdote was plainly well-known and goes back at least to Ion of Chios (FGrH 392 F 13 = Plut.
Kim. 9. 1). For discussion, see Marcaccini (2001).
25 Thus Holden, who accepts u™perorøn, is forced to take oçqen as ‘referring [only] to the fomer clause of
the preceding sentence: i.e. because he did not learn mousiκä etc. in the usual way’.
26 Deinote¯s is cleverness or skill, even cunning – as Aristotle puts it, the ability to attain one’s aim, whether
good or bad (NE 1144a). See Frazier (1996) 210–12; Duff (2008a) 6. For the contrast of true education and the
teaching of mere deinote¯s, cf. Per. 4. 2.
27 Plutarch also says (2. 6) that Mnesiphilos’ successors transferred the application of his teaching ‘from
deeds to words’. So what Mnesiphilos taught was action.
28 For further analyses of these passages, see Duff (2008a) 11–18.
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parallel for the combination of intelligence and attention to practical training with
lack of true education, and the association of this educational imbalance with trusting
or following one’s physis, can be found in a fragment of Diodoros, which discusses the
Lusitanian leader Viriathus (33. 7. 7)29. Viriathus, says the author, was a master of the
pithy remark, ‘since he had no experience of formal education (e ¬gκuκlíou paideíav),
but was educated in practical intelligence (praκtiκñı … sunései)’ 30. ‘For’, the passage
continues, ‘the speech of a man who lives according to nature (a¬κoloúqwv tñı fúsei)
is concise …’31.
Themistokles and the erotic metaphor
We have seen, then, that in terms of the logic of the passage u™pererøn seems prefer-
able. We have also seen that there are parallels to the pattern of a rejection of true 
education combined with a concentration on practical training and intelligence. 
I would like finally to demonstrate that support for u™pererøn, with its erotic metaphor,
is found in the broader literary context, that is, the literary tradition on Themistokles,
and in the language in which Plutarch himself describes Themistokles’ character and
ambition in the next chapter of the Life. 
First, a passage of Aelian makes clear that there was a tradition of seeing Themi-
stokles’ passion for action in erotic terms. Aelian records the following story: ‘For 
after being disowned by his father, Themistokles forsook his intemperance and began
to behave with somewhat more moderation, and abandoned his harlots and began 
to fall in love with another object (h¢ra dè e ¢rwta e çteron) – Athenian politics’ (VH 
2. 12)32. It seems probable that both Plutarch and Aelian are drawing on the same
source or the same tradition. Plutarch mentions Themistokles’ rejection by his father
in 2. 8, and his sudden temperance in chapter 333. It is therefore likely that Plutarch 
found the notion of Themistokles’ being ‘in love with’ action or politics in at least one
of his sources – perhaps combined, as in Aelian, with the notion of a rejection of more
corporeal erotic passions34. If Plutarch did write u™pererøn here, then, he has changed
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29 Quoted in Constant. Porphyr. De sent. 388. It may derive originally from Poseidonios.
30 tñv mèn e ¬gκuκlíou paideíav a¢peiron o¢nta, praκtiκñı dè sunései pepaideuménon. The term e ¬gκúκliov
paideía (or e ¬gκúκlia paideúmata) is a common one for general liberal education, Plutarch’s tøn paideúsewn
tàv mèn h¬qopoioùv h£ pròv h™donän tina κaì cárin e ¬leuqérion. See Alex. 7. 2, with Hamilton (1969) ad loc. The
link between e ¬gκúκliov paideía and ‘liberal’ (e ¬leúqeriov) education or ‘free-born’ (e ¬leúqeroi) students is
made explicit at ps.-Plut. De lib. educ. 7c; Strabo 1. 1. 22; cf. ps.-Luc. Amores 45.
31 Cf. 33. 7. 3 and 5, ‘since he brought out his words from a self-taught and unspoilt nature’ (e ¬x
au¬todidáκtou κaì a¬diastrófou fúsewv), and Sacks (1990) 37–38.
32 h¢ra dè e ¢rwta eçteron tòn tñv politeíav tøn ’Aqhnaíwn.
33 The story of his rejection, mentioned also by the Socratic writer Aischines (SSR VI A 48), is almost 
certainly not historically reliable: see Piccirilli (1982a).
34 The two authors share several other anecdotes. Details in Podlecki (1975) 128–9 and 141.
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what he found in the tradition from a point about politics to one about studies in 
preparation for politics35. 
Indeed, the metaphor of Themistokles’ eros for practical action or success is promi-
nent in the next chapter of the Life, where Plutarch describes Themistokles’ entry
into politics. Plutarch begins by claiming that, despite his father’s attempts to dissuade
him, ‘politics quickly and vigorously laid hold of Themistokles’ (açyasqai toû Qemi-
stoκléouv) and ‘an intense impulse (o™rmä) towards glory seemed to master him’ (3. 1).
According to normal usage of açptesqai, one would expect Themistokles to be the
subject of this verb (e.g. Them. 25. 5, prìn açptesqai tñv politeíav). Instead, he is
here presented as the passive victim of a strong desire for practical action36. The 
language of desire is continued immediately afterwards, when Themistokles’ rivalry
with Aristeides is traced back to an instance of ‘real’ eros – their both falling in love
(h¬rásqhsan) with the same boy, Stesilaos of Keos (3. 2). A few lines later erotic 
metaphors are again prominent. Themistokles is described as ‘a lover (e ¬rastäv) of
great deeds’ (3. 4). Consequently, after the battle of Marathon, he is lost in thought
and stays up all night; he declares to troubled friends that he cannot sleep for thinking
of Miltiades’ trophy at Marathon (3. 4–5). The image is of the obsessed lover, lying
awake37: Miltiades’ trophy has become, metaphorically, an object of passion38. The
metaphor of erotic love as an image for Themistokles’ devotion to the practical, begun
in 2. 3 with u™pererøn, is thus continued and developed. Themistokles really was 
passionately ‘in love with’ the practical and with practical success.
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35 For eros used metaphorically, see e.g. Thuc. 3. 45. 5, 6. 13. 1 and 6. 24. 3 (desire for military conquest);
Pind. Pyth. 3. 19–23, Lysias 12. 78, Theok. 10. 8, Plut. Pyrrh. 26. 1 and Mar. 45. 11 (‘love for what is absent’).
See also below, nn. 37–38.
36 Cf. Moles (1985) 261.
37 For sleeplessness as an erotic motif, see McKeown (1989), note on Ovid Am. 1. 2. 1–4. A parallel for the
erotic metaphor can also be seen in Dion 11. 1. Plutarch has already talked of the young Dionysios II’s lack of
education in chs. 9–10; now Dionysios is seized by ‘a keen and frenzied passion’ (e ¢rwv … o¬xùv κaì perima-
näv) for Sokrates’ teaching and company. His interest does not last: eros, in Plutarch, tends to imply lack of 
reasoning and so instability.
38 Plutarch mentions Themistokles’ emulation of Miltiades, in the same language, also in Prof. in virt.
84b–c; De cap. ex inim. 92c; Reg. et imp. apophth. 184f–185a (long considered spurious, but see Flacelière
1976, 100–3; Beck 2002); Praec. ger. 800b; it is also found in Cic. Tusc. 4. 19. 44 and Val. Max. 8. 14 ext. 1. See
Pérez Jiménez (2008) and Stadter (2008) 59–60 for analysis. Cf. Marc. 28. 4–5 on Marcellus’ passion to fight
Hannibal: ‘For no-one else ever had a such a passion for anything (e ¢rwta tosoûton h¬rásqh) … This was 
his dream at night’; Per. 20. 4 (based on Thuc. 6. 13. 1 and 6. 24. 3), ‘Many were possessed by that mad and 
inauspicious love for Sicily (o™ dúserwv e ¬κeînov h¢dh κaì dúspotmov e ¢rwv) … Some also dreamed of Tuscany
and Carthage …’
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Abstract
This paper argues that the emendation u™pererøn for ms. u™perorøn in Them. 2. 3, although rejected by
many editors and commentators, should be accepted. The manuscripts have Themistokles ‘despising’ practical
studies, that is studies which promoted ‘intelligence and action’. But this makes little sense in context and 
disrupts the logic of the whole chapter, which presupposes a contrast between real education, which Themi-
stokles rejects, and practical activities, on which he concentrates and for which he was suited by nature. It is
much more plausible that Themistokles is presented as having ‘an excessive love’ for practical studies. Indeed,
this combination – rejection of true education and enthusiasm for practical training – characterises several
other subjects of Plutarch, while erotic metaphors are used to describe Themistokles’ obsession with practical
success in the next chapter.
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